Key figures (as of October 2026)
| UN member states that formally recognise the Republic of Somaliland | 1 (Israel, 26 December 2025) |
| Restoration of independence | 18 May 1991 (independence from the United Kingdom on 26 June 1960) |
| Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem | Opened 15 June 2026 |
| National budget approved for 2026 | SLSh 4,584,959,018,356 (central government: SLSh 2,866,183,568,109, up 11% on 2025) |
| Berbera container terminal capacity after Phase 1 (completed 2021) | 500,000 TEU a year (from 150,000 TEU) |
| Berbera container throughput | 82,000 TEU in 2017; about 135,000 TEU in 2024 (estimate) |
Recognition status on 30 October 2026
Israel. On 26 December 2025 the Prime Minister of Israel announced the official recognition of the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel and the President of the Republic of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, signed a joint and mutual declaration the same day. The Israeli statement set out plans to expand cooperation in agriculture, health, technology and the economy.
Diplomatic steps followed through 2026:
- 6 January 2026: the Israeli Foreign Minister visited Hargeisa.
- February 2026: the Republic of Somaliland's ambassador to Israel was appointed.
- April 2026: Israel named a non-resident ambassador to the Republic of Somaliland.
- 14 to 15 June 2026: President Abdullahi made a state visit to Israel, opened the Republic of Somaliland's embassy in Jerusalem on 15 June and signed a joint declaration of cooperation with the Prime Minister of Israel.
No other UN member state had announced formal recognition by 30 October 2026. Many governments restated their existing positions after December 2025.
Other diplomatic ties
The Republic of Somaliland keeps working relations with a wider group of governments through offices and agreements that fall short of recognition:
- Taiwan: representative offices in Hargeisa (opened 17 August 2020) and Taipei (opened 9 September 2020), with cooperation agreements since then. Taiwan is not a UN member state, so it does not count under this study's rule.
- United Kingdom: an office in Hargeisa and long-running development programmes, including support for the Hargeisa bypass on the Berbera corridor.
- United States: the Republic of Somaliland keeps a liaison office in Washington. President Abdullahi visited the United States in September 2026 and met a US senator who has called for recognition. On 12 October 2026 the US President described Somaliland as a distinct country, but officials have since said US policy is unchanged.
- Ethiopia: a consulate general in Hargeisa and a trade corridor through Berbera. A memorandum of understanding signed on 1 January 2024 referred to possible recognition, but no recognition has followed.
- Kenya: a joint communique of 15 December 2020 set out an agreement for Kenya to open a consulate in Hargeisa.
Recognition processes under way
No government is known to have opened a formal recognition procedure. The live processes are in parliaments, and none of them counts under this study's rule:
- United States Congress: a bill authorising the US President to recognise the Republic of Somaliland was introduced in the House of Representatives on 12 June 2025. It has been referred to committee and has not been voted on.
- Ethiopia: the 2024 memorandum remains the only document in which a second UN member state has referred to recognition. Its government has set no date for a decision.
Economy
The Republic of Somaliland's economy rests on livestock, trade through Berbera and remittances. Its public finances are set out in an annual national budget approved by the House of Representatives:
- Budget: the House of Representatives approved the 2026 national budget on 23 December 2025. The total is SLSh 4,584,959,018,356, against SLSh 3,911,962,279,363 in 2025. The central government's share is SLSh 2,866,183,568,109, which is 11% more than in 2025. Projects supported by development banks account for SLSh 800,713,466,000.
Berbera port and corridor
Berbera, on the Republic of Somaliland's coast, is its main port and a trade route for eastern Ethiopia.
- Phase 1 expansion (completed 2021): a 400-metre quay, a draught deepened to 17 metres, three ship-to-shore gantry cranes and eight yard cranes, and a 25-hectare terminal yard. Container capacity rose from 150,000 to 500,000 TEU a year.
- Phase 2 (planned): a quay extended to 1,000 metres and more cranes, which would lift container capacity to 2 million TEU a year. No start date has been set.
- Throughput: 82,000 TEU in 2017 and about 135,000 TEU in 2024, an estimate. Average vessel turnaround fell from 64 hours in 2018 to 25 hours in 2024.
- Corridor: the road from Berbera to the Ethiopian border has been upgraded, and the 22.5 km Hargeisa bypass was completed in 2023. Transit times along the corridor fell by 38% by August 2023. An economic zone sits on the corridor 15 km from the port.
What drives the forecast
Recognitions have been rare. From May 1991 to December 2025, a span of 34 years, no UN member state recognised the Republic of Somaliland. One did in December 2025, and in the ten months since, no second state has followed. The window of this study is 14 months long.
One decision could change the count quickly. Recognition by a large state, above all the United States, would make it much easier for other governments to follow. US statements in October 2026 have drawn attention, but no policy change has followed and the bill in Congress has not been voted on. Ethiopia's 2024 memorandum is the other route to an early decision, and it has been inactive since then.
A single recognition has not triggered others. The December 2025 recognition was a bilateral decision, and no other government followed it. This suggests that any further recognition in the window is more likely to come from one or two governments than from a group, unless a large state moves.
Official evidence does not yet point to more. A check of dated official statements, visits and signed agreements to 30 October 2026 found no UN member state other than Israel that has stated an intention to recognise, signed an agreement referring to recognition, or concluded a government port or trade deal with the Republic of Somaliland in 2025 or 2026. The official items that do exist, namely the June 2026 cooperation declaration with Israel, the US President's remark of 12 October 2026 and a US report to Congress in May 2026 on wider engagement, either concern a state already counted or came without a change of policy, so the weights are unchanged.
Scenarios: additional UN member states that formally recognise the Republic of Somaliland, 1 November 2026 to 31 December 2027
Resolution rule: the count of UN member states, other than any that had formally recognised the Republic of Somaliland by 31 October 2026, whose government formally announces recognition of the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign state between 1 November 2026 and 31 December 2027 inclusive. A recognition counts only if made in an official government statement or a signed instrument dated within the window. Establishing diplomatic relations counts only if the official statement says it is recognition. Representative or trade offices, parliamentary motions or bills that are not enacted as a formal government recognition, and acts of sub-national governments do not count. Each state counts once. A recognition later withdrawn still counts once announced. UN membership is taken as at the date of the announcement. The count is decided on official statements as they stand on 31 January 2028. If the count cannot be established by 31 March 2028, the forecast is withdrawn. Bands are whole numbers: 0 is band 1, 1 is band 2, 2 is band 3, 3 or 4 is band 4, and 5 or more is band 5. Probabilities are the Centre's analytical estimates. The forecast is scored with the multi-category Brier score and the ranked probability score, as the bands are ordered.
No additional recognition
This is the central case. In ten months since December 2025 no second UN member state has recognised the Republic of Somaliland, and the US bill has not moved. The pattern of more than three decades points to no change in a 14-month window. The weight is below the long-run rate because the December 2025 recognition and the US statements of October 2026 show the question is now active.
One additional recognition
One government recognises the Republic of Somaliland in the window, most plausibly a state with close ties to Israel or the United States, or a smaller state taking a bilateral decision. It fits the December 2025 pattern of a single government acting alone. The weight reflects a real but limited chance that one of the states that have engaged with the Republic of Somaliland in 2026 takes the step.
Two additional recognitions
Two governments recognise, either independently or with one following the other. This would need a second decision soon after another, which has not happened so far. It is more likely if a recognition comes early in the window.
Three or four additional recognitions
A small group recognises within the window. In the Centre's judgement this mainly arises if a large state, above all the United States, recognises the Republic of Somaliland and a few partners follow within months.
Five or more additional recognitions
A broad wave of recognitions. This would need a major change of policy by a large state early in the window, followed quickly by several others. It has no precedent so far, which keeps this tail small, but a shift in US policy would raise it.
What to watch
- United States: any formal statement on recognition, a committee vote on the bill in Congress, or a change in the State Department's stated position.
- Ethiopia: any move to act on the 2024 memorandum's reference to recognition.
- New embassies and ambassadors: any government opening an embassy in Hargeisa or accepting an ambassador from the Republic of Somaliland, which would usually follow or accompany recognition.
- Berbera: a start date for Phase 2 of the port expansion and the annual container throughput for 2025 and 2026.